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Briefing Report

50th Anniversary of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration: Present Situation and Future Prospect of Japan-Russia Relations

Professor, School of International Politics, Economics and Business, Aoyama Gakuin University
Mr. Shigeki Hakamada

[International] December 4 , 2006

Recently there have been some rather scary incidents reported relating to Russia, but today I would like to speak about a slightly safer topic. This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. I will talk about Japan-Russia relations, the territorial problem, and Japan’s policy toward Russia from now on in relation to that Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration and the 1993 Tokyo Declaration.

1. Historical Significance of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration

As a result of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, the state of war between the two countries was declared to be ended, bilateral diplomatic ties were restored, and the road to Japan’s accession to the United Nations was opened. Agreement was reached on the prisoner-of-war problem and the fisheries problem. In other words, in the sense that important agreements were made that should essentially be included in a peace treaty, it was, I think, a very important declaration historically. My father was detained in Siberia, and the restoration of diplomatic ties between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1956 made it possible for us to correspond with him for the first time. I was a junior high school student then, but I remember those days very clearly. At that time, however, Japan and the Soviet Union were not able to conclude a peace treaty, and still today Japan and Russia have not concluded or have not been able to conclude one because the territorial problem remains unresolved.

At the time of the conclusion of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, there were various opinions within Japan. For example, such people as then Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama and former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida did not necessarily see eye to eye. With this joint declaration, however, it was agreed that the two islands of Habomai and Shikotan would be returned (turned over) after the conclusion of a peace treaty. The problem was that the two sides did not interpret the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration in the same way. While the Soviet Union thought that the return of the two islands would be a final solution, Japan’s understanding was that discussions on Kunashiri and Etorofu would continue. Japan saw the promises made in a note exchanged between Shunichi Matsumoto and Andrei Gromyko and the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration as following the same line and therefore insisted on continued discussions. So their interpretations differed, and that is the source of today’s dispute.

After that, there was an unfortunate period during the Cold War when the territorial problem was used especially for political purposes. That is to say, the Northern Territories problem certainly was used politically so that Japan and the Soviet Union did not get close or get too close. So actually the United States also bears a heavy responsibility for the fact that this problem still remains in such a form. A short time ago I said to an American diplomat stationed in Japan that actually the United States is also to blame, but the young diplomat did not understand the meaning. If I had not explained it to him, that person, even though he was a diplomat, would not have understood the situation.

2. The Territorial Problem and a Recent Opinion Poll

Recently the Yomiuri Shimbun conducted an opinion poll relating to the Northern Territories problem, and the following results were reported in its October 4 edition. Replying to the question of whether they thought the Northern Territories problem was an impediment to bilateral relations, of 3,000 respondents nationwide, 85 percent answered “yes” and 11 percent “no.” Asked about their impression of Russia, 70 percent of respondents had a negative impression and 17 percent had a positive impression. In other words, unfortunately, traditionally since the Soviet days an overwhelming majority of Japanese, from 70 to 80 percent, have a negative impression. These figures show us that the mistrust that the Japanese feel toward Russia is very strong indeed. The opinion poll shows clearly that a major cause is the Northern Territories problem. The reason why I think so is that recently economic relations and cultural exchange have certainly not been in a poor state. Also, apart from this issue, there are no serious political problems existing between Japan and Russia. So the territorial problem is a major cause of the mistrust that the Japanese harbor toward Russia. So this is also the reason why we believe that the territorial problem must definitely be solved.

(The necessity of solving the territorial problem)
There are two or three other reasons why this territorial problem needs to be solved and why Japan is so preoccupied with it.

(1) A problem of state sovereignty and state dignity
One is the problem of state sovereignty, or, to put it another way, state dignity. A state cannot exist if its dignity is slighted. Concerning the territorial problem, Russians often say to me that while Japan is a country with few natural resources, the Northern Territories and the sea around them have abundant resources, so Japan is demanding the territories just because it wants their resources. In response, I always reply that Japan has proven historically that a nation can become affluent even without natural resources and there are other countries that show that even if a nation has abundant resources, the people might not be affluent. The demand for the return of the islands is certainly not for the purpose of getting the resources.

(2) For the normalization of Japan-Russia relations
The second reason is that Japan-Russia relations today are not normal after all. As I just explained, the results of opinion polls show that there is a strong mistrust. So I believe that the conclusion of a peace treaty and normalization of relations in the true sense are essential. Regarding a peace treaty, I often hear the opinion in Russia that economic and cultural relations between Japan and Russia are making progress and so a peace treaty is not necessary any more and that relations between Germany and Russia are going well even though there is no peace treaty between them, either.

(3) Is a peace treaty necessary? (Germany and Russia do not have one.)
Actually, Germany does not have a peace treaty with any country, not only Russia. That is to say, immediately after the end of the war, a state entity existed in Japan that was able to conclude a peace treaty, but in Germany such an entity had disappeared. And after that, Germany became a divided state. Regarding border problems, however, Germany has properly concluded treaties with all of its neighboring countries. So the peace treaty that we are talking about is the same as the treaties relating to borders and territory that Germany has already concluded. In that sense, we are not calling for anything different from Germany.

(4) Are territorial problems, sovereignty problems, and the nation-state legacies of the past?
Finally, there is the opinion that territorial problems, sovereignty problems, and the problem of the nation-state are now issues of the past. Certainly the world is heading toward an era of globalization and no borders in one sense. Some people say that, as the integration of Europe shows, we should no longer be preoccupied by border problems. In fact, however, a basic condition for membership of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is that the country should not be involved in any border or ethnic conflicts. In other words, a basic condition for European integration is not that border problems are treated lightly or neglected but that such problems are settled properly. In that sense, such a territorial problem would be very much emphasized in Europe as well.

3. President Putin’s Understanding of Japan-Russia Relations
Next I would like to talk briefly about how President Vladimir Putin sees Japan-Russia relations and the territorial problem at present.

The other day, and also in the fall of 2005, I took part in the Valdai Discussion Club, a meeting of around three hours at which President Putin exchanges opinions directly with the participants. The Valdai meeting, which was held for the third time this year, is organized by the state-run RIA Novosti news agency---in other words, virtually by the Russian government. About 40 experts in Russian affairs and leading media representatives are invited from foreign countries, but strangely enough they are nearly all from the United States and Europe. Last year I was the only participant from Asia, so I said to the organizers that this was not normal and suggested that they should invite a few more people from Asia. This year, as well as Japan, they did also invite one person from China. In these circumstances, although it was supposed to be a free discussion, there was a danger that interest would focus mainly on issues relating to Europe and the United States. So I approached the representative from China and also an expert who had been invited from Chatham House in the United Kingdom [the Royal Institute of International Affairs], who was of Chinese descent, and we formulated a kind of strategy.

Since there were 40 participants, we couldn’t be sure about how the opportunity to speak would go round, so I proposed that among us three persons, instead of individual issues, the first person given a chance to speak would ask about President Putin’s general policy toward Asia, and in particular his policies toward China and Japan, and then the second and third speakers would be able to ask more specific questions. This proposal was accepted. What surprised me a little was the fact that despite the questions being about China and Japan in that order, President Putin began by talking about Japan, and he went on to speak in considerable detail about the Northern Territories problem and the border problem. I have already written about this in the Chuo Koron [November 2006] and Sekai Shuho [October 31, 2006] magazines, so please read those articles.

The thing that I was able to clearly understand from the meetings with President Putin last year and this year is that, following the agreement with China, he has quite a strong desire to solve the border problem with Japan as well. We Japanese are often asked by foreign experts and diplomats why, in its relations with Russia, Japan is so preoccupied with minor issues, such as the territorial problem. Actually, it is not only Japan that is preoccupied with this problem. Judging by the meetings with President Putin, Russia is quite preoccupied with it as well. That no doubt is the result of Japanese diplomacy toward Russia so far. But anyway, it is definitely not only Japan that is preoccupied with the problem. I want you all to understand that.

As for why President Putin is so concerned about this problem, I think one of the reasons is that Russia has settled border problems with Kazakhstan and China, and Putin wants to build stable relations with all surrounding countries. Also, at this year’s Valdai Discussion Club, he spoke proudly of the final settlement of the border problem with China as a “historic feat.” To an extent, I think his ambition is to solve the difficult problem with Japan that has continued for many years and thereby leave his mark on history as president. Third, the China factor cannot be ignored, either. At present Russia officially is maintaining good relations politically and economically with China. Under the surface, however, Russia always has a sense of wariness and fear toward China, and this mentality will probably continue in the future. Thinking in the long term, there is the feeling among Russians somewhere that strategically it is extremely important for them to build proper relations with Japan.

So how does President Putin think this problem should be solved? The basis of his thinking seems to be that the return of two islands based on the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration will be a final solution. Accordingly, the Tokyo Declaration is an extremely inconvenient document for the Russian side. That is to say, in the Tokyo Declaration, Japan and Russia agreed to solve the problem of the attribution of the four islands and then conclude a peace treaty. In other words, Japan and Russia promised that not only Habomai and Shikotan but also Kunashiri and Etorofu would be the subject of negotiations. In that sense, Russia recently has clarified its attitude of ignoring the Tokyo Declaration.

4. Difficulty of Solving the Northern Territories Problem
Regarding the question of whether this problem might be solved in the near future given that President Putin does have a certain desire to do so, I am not very optimistic. I say this because in Russia right now the hard-line stance toward Japan is much stronger than the desire of President Putin to solve the problem that I just explained. And the big-power mentality and nationalist atmosphere are strong. Accordingly, objectively speaking, my understanding is that for Japan the situation at the moment is not advantageous for solving the problem.

Why is Russia recently displaying a hard-line stance especially over the territorial problem? One factor is that because of oil money and so on, Russia is beginning again to gain confidence as a big power. In connection with this, nationalism is gaining momentum inside Russia. At the same time, people related to security and the military—the so-called siloviki—are establishing a core position in the administration, and basically these people tend to take a hard-line stance.

Of course, there have been various problems on the Japanese side, too. That is to say, while it can be said that Japan’s foreign policy of getting President Putin to understand the importance of the border problem has certainly been successful, it is also a fact that until now Japan has sent some seriously mistaken signals. Recently I spoke with a Russian expert in Moscow. It was in September, just before the establishment of the Abe administration, and I was asked, “We are interested in what stance the new Abe administration will take in its policy toward Russia, and especially the issue of a peace treaty. Will he adopt the standpoint of Yoshiro Mori or Junichiro Koizumi? What do you think, Mr. Hakamada?” I was a little surprised and asked, “Are you thinking that Mori advocated the return of two islands and Koizumi the return of four islands?” And the reply was “Yes.” The fact is that at one time Japanese government officials and Foreign Ministry officials did send a mistaken signal that caused this misunderstanding on the Russian side. I wrote about this in detail in the Chuo Koron article that I mentioned earlier, so I won’t explain about it here.

5. Can Japan, a Defeated Country, Demand the Return of the Islands? Is It Realistic?
I am also often asked the following question in Russia: “Didn’t Japan seize the southern part of Sakhalin in the Russo-Japanese War? We only did the same thing.” Or, “This is the result of war. You must accept the fact that Japan was a defeated country.” Or, “Japan was the aggressor before and during World War II, wasn’t it? Receiving a punishment is only natural.” I frequently hear such opinions. In fact, around the time of the Russo-Japanese War, war was considered to be legal internationally as the ultimate means for settling international conflicts. And it was considered to be a natural right of victors to take reparations and merge territories. Of course, such steps were taken through agreements based on proper peace treaties. After World War I, however, the defeated country, Germany, was forced to pay huge reparations and so on based on the Treaty of Versailles, and this created the climate for the emergence of Nazism. After that, since taking territory and reparations from defeated nations could become the cause of future wars, the international principle became one of no territorial acquisitions and no reparations. This was stated clearly in the Atlantic Charter of 1941, and the Soviet Union was one of the first to sign that document. It was also clearly stated in the Cairo Declaration of 1943, which discussed the conditions for Japan’s surrender, that it was not necessary for even a defeated country to give up territories other than those that the country took by violence and greed—that is, through imperialistic policies.

As the Great Empire of Japan, Japan occupied such territories as Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula, and, as the defeated country, it forfeited all of those territories. But historically the four northern islands have never once been a part of Russian territory, and they were recognized peacefully as Japanese territory through agreement in the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation between Japan and Russia [Shimoda Treaty] signed in 1855. Accordingly, even if Japan recognizes that it was the aggressor during World War II, these are territories that Japan does not have to give up. That is our basic understanding.

Speaking in Riga, Latvia, in May 2005, US President George W. Bush described the 1945 Yalta Agreement as “one of the greatest wrongs of history.” As you know, in the Yalta Agreement, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt called for the Soviet Union to enter into the war against Japan with the conditions that the Kurile islands, the southern part of Sakhalin, and so on would be handed over to the Soviet Union. However, the historical evaluation of that Yalta Agreement is now bringing to light various problems. Details about the Yalta Agreement can be found in Arthur Conte’s book Yalta ou le partage du monde [Yalta or the Sharing Out of the World, 1964].

I do not intend to say, like the Japanese Communist Party does, that the Yalta Agreement was irrational, so Russia should return all of the Kurile islands or demand the return of the southern part of Sakhalin to Japan. In the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Japan renounced its right to those territories. I think that Japan should maintain that position. What I want to say, however, is that it is irrational to claim that since Japan, as the defeated country, was naturally punished, so it is natural for Russia to occupy the four northern islands. Also, Russia does not have the right to exact punishment alone. An international agreement is necessary. Former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov admitted in the Duma that no internationally recognized border exists between Japan and Russia. Recently some people in Russia have been saying that the present border is already recognized under international law, but it is impossible for a border that the two countries have not agreed on to be recognized internationally. Territory between France and Germany has been seized and taken back on numerous occasions, but without fail the border changes have been recognized historically on the basis of agreements in peace treaties between the two countries. In principle, it is just not possible for a border that is not recognized by the other party to be approved under international law. In that sense, what we are saying is that Japan and Russia should demarcate a border that can be properly recognized under international law. In the end, I think that can only be achieved through political resolve. The form that any solution might take remains unclear.

Those are my personal views, anyway. Regarding Japan’s policy toward Russia and the thoughts of Prime Minister Abe on the matter, I would like to discuss them in my replies to your questions.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Then let me ask right away, what is your opinion of the stance of the Abe administration toward this problem?

A: I have had private, informal talks with Abe on several occasions, although not since he became prime minister. I cannot tell you about what we spoke about, but I would like to give you my impressions.

The other day Prime Minister Abe met with President Putin, and they agreed to develop mutual relations and bilateral relations and to solve the peace treaty problem as well. However, Abe has not announced any clear policy toward Russia. One of the reasons is that for the Abe administration, first of all the normalization of relations with China and with South Korea are more urgent issues. Basically though, regarding problems of sovereignty and the state, I think that Abe, as a realist, has an extremely detached perception. Foreign Minister Taro Aso is also a realist, but he has a more business-like mentality. Accordingly, my understanding is that Abe has a clearer recognition of matters of the state and state sovereignty. In addition, unlike former Prime Minister Koizumi, Abe puts quite a lot of emphasis in his policies on relations with government and Liberal Democratic Party leaders, such as former Prime Minister Mori, and with past leaders. At present various factors are entangled, so Abe has not come forward with any clear policy toward Russia or the Northern Territories problem. However, basically he does have a clear understanding regarding matters of sovereignty and the state, so my impression is that he naturally has a strong desire to solve the problem properly and normalize Japan-Russia relations.

Q: What is the position of the US government, which is Japan’s ally, on the Northern Territories problem? And you said that the problem had been used politically. What is the present situation?

A: Earlier I said that in the Cold War era the United States used this problem strategically. At present, however, the United States basically supports Japan’s position. Having said that, though, the United States is not going to take the initiative and do something about the problem. Basically the United States supports Japan’s position, but it believes that the problem should be settled through the initiative of Japan and Russia.

Q: In your talk, you said that one of the reasons why Russia is adopting a hard-line policy toward Japan, including the Northern Territories problem, is its self-confidence as a big power and the rise of nationalism. But couldn’t it be said that one other reason, for example, is Russia’s good relations with China?

A: I think that’s a very good question. It is a fact that in recent years relations between the Western countries, including Japan, and Russia have been a little chilly. I don’t think they have returned to the Cold War era, but it is also a fact that a condition of “cold peace” has emerged. As a closely related fact, as you say, relations between Russia and China have become stronger, and I think this is an extremely important factor in the background of the current situation.

Let me tell you about an incident that is related to this. Both last year and this year, before the Valdai Discussion Club meeting with President Putin, there was a three-day conference attended by Russian opinion leaders and invited experts from other countries. Irina Hakamada [former vice-speaker of the Russian Duma], who is my younger sister, also participated, and at the 2005 conference she asked me the following question: “Russia and China settled their border problem very quietly and without any fuss, but why is it that there is so much fuss with Japan and the problem still cannot be solved?” My reply at that time was that unfortunately Russia at the moment places far more importance on China than it does on Japan. Or as I said earlier, perhaps it can be said that under the surface Russia has a greater fear of China. But I also said at that time, “It is not that we Japanese do not know how to dramatically change Russia’s attitude toward Japan. However, we do not want to use that method.” I went on, “That method would be for Japan to possess nuclear weapons. We have chosen the road of a nonnuclear state, but if Russia continues its attitude of neglecting Japan in the future, there is a possibility that the argument for Japan to possess nuclear weapons will gain momentum. People will say that Japan is being ignored in this manner because it does not have nuclear weapons. I personally do not hope for that situation, so accordingly I would like Russia to make a more serious response to Japan.”

Q: If the territorial problem were solved, do you think the impression of Russia given by Japanese in public opinion surveys would really improve? Would there be more trust?

A: Once I received the following criticism from a Russian diplomat. He suggested that the Japanese media and experts in Russian affairs were to blame for Russia’s poor image in Japan. That is to say, the Japanese only get their image from the media and experts, so the bad image, he claimed, comes from the fact that experts only draw a negative picture of Russia. In response to that diplomat, I said as follows: “The duty of us scholars is to describe the situation objectively, and for that purpose we are making the utmost efforts. The question of whether the resulting image is positive or negative depends on Russia itself.” Recently the journalist Anna Politkovskaya was murdered. If a negative image of Russia was created in connection with that event, the Japanese media and experts who reported and commented on the affair are not to blame. The cause lies in the situation in Russia itself. What I want to say is that of course the image of Russia will not improve just because the Northern Territories problem is solved. Everything depends on the situation in Russia. As the opinion polls clearly show, however, it is also a fact that the Northern Territories problem is bringing down the image of Russia quite a bit. Accordingly, if the territorial problem were settled, although Russia’s image among the Japanese would not entirely turn positive, it would change considerably. In addition, the mistrust of Russia would be greatly reduced. And the stance of the business community toward Russia would no doubt change as well.

Q: Regarding the US response to Japan-Russia relations, you said earlier that during the Cold War the United States used the Northern Territories problem strategically to prevent any rapprochement between Japan and Russia. Is that situation basically unchanged even now?

A: In the 1990s the United States adopted a completely different attitude. The reason was that at that time the Western countries, including Japan, had the understanding that supporting democratization and marketization in Russia was extremely important. At that time Japan, the United States, and Russia organized a trilateral meeting, of which I was a member. Our basic understanding at that time was that exchange relations between the United States and Russia and between the United States and Japan were close, but the Japan-Russia relationship was the weakest side of the triangle. So Japan was not able to provide proper support for democratization and the formation of a market economy in Russia. The United States wanted Japan to cooperate as well, so there was an atmosphere of let’s work together to solve the Northern Territories problem as well.

However, conditions at present differ from those in the 1990s. I don’t think the United States will take the same approach to this problem as it did in the Cold War era or in the 1990s. I think that a return to the approach of the Cold War era is impossible. That is to say, the situation in which the United States engaged in various maneuvers to deliberately and politically use the Northern Territories problem in order to prevent any rapprochement between Japan and Russia would be unthinkable now.

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* Given on December 4, 2006, at the Foreign Press Center/Japan (FPCJ). This paper is reserved for internal use; any reproduction or quotation is forbidden without prior permission from the FPCJ. ©FPCJ 2006