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Briefing Report

Japan-China Relations and the Situation in Northeast Asia

Director, Institute of East Asian Studies, and Professor, Faculty of Law and Politics, Keio University
Mr. Ryosei Kokubun

[International] October 27 , 2006

I am proud to have this opportunity to speak about my personal views concerning recent Japan-China relations, domestic politics in China, and the problem of North Korea, and I am delighted to be able to come here today.

Until three days ago I was in China to attend a meeting of the New Japan-China Friendship Committee for the 21st Century, a private-sector advisory body set up by Japan and China. I serve as a member and also as the secretary general of that committee. Originally I was scheduled to return from that meeting a little sooner, but then it became possible for the Japanese delegation to meet with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, so we extended our itinerary. The committee was established in 2003 by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Chinese President Hu Jintao. Since then this committee also has devoted its utmost efforts toward finding a way out of the strained bilateral relationship brought about by the Yasukuni Shrine issue. However, as a result of the recent visit to China by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the atmosphere this time changed completely. To be frank, during the week that we stayed in China, which came immediately after the summit talks, the atmosphere between the beginning and the end changed dramatically. That is to say, during this period as well, I think that China strengthened its approach of looking for a breakthrough in relations. In addition, Prime Minister Abe himself showed great interest in this delegation, and our delegation team [headed by Yotaro Kobayashi, an advisor at Fuji Xerox Co.] reported on the content of the meeting to the prime minister both just before we left and yesterday.

I would like to divide my talk today into several parts. First, as an introduction, I will explain how quite a few new factors have emerged as a result of Prime Minister Abe’s recent visit to China. At the end of Abe’s visit this time, the two sides issued a joint press statement. In the past there have been three political documents between Japan and China. Relations have not reached as far as that level yet, but the joint press statement was issued as an important agreement of the summit meeting this time.

I think the joint press statement has three characteristics. First, it is extremely forward-looking, and it makes almost no mention of the history problem and the Taiwan problem. Second, in connection with this, for the first time ever it positions the bilateral relationship as a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests ---in other words, as a strategic relationship. Past Japan-China relations were characterized, simply speaking, by the word “friendship.” The emphasis was placed on a bilateral relationship of “friendship.” In the latest document, however, this is replaced by a more global strategic relationship. As a coincidental factor, the first task of this strategic relationship is for Japan and China to deal jointly with the problem of North Korea. This reality is developing at a rapid pace. The third characteristic of the joint press statement is dialogue. That is to say, bearing in mind that relations so far have been extremely difficult, the two sides are seeking to strengthen relations quickly. They are trying to make up for the lack of summit-level exchange until now and at the same time endeavoring to have a dialogue in terms of joint history research.

The last time I spoke here was at a time when Japan-China relations were at their most difficult. I think I gave a talk here just after anti-Japanese demonstrations had occurred in China. But I don’t think I was all that pessimistic on that occasion. The reason was that ties of mutual interdependence between Japan and China are now spreading a great deal, and there is no going back. I recall explaining that the problem was that the political relations at the top between the two countries were not going well. The break in the relations between the top leaders was closely related to domestic politics, and as a result the situation had become stagnant. And all the focal points in the deterioration of ties came to be centered on the weakest part of the bilateral relationship---that is, the problem of Yasukuni Shrine. However, I remember explaining, the essential problem in relations between Japan and China is not only the historical part but also the structural issue. For example, I explained that the structure of the China policy of the Liberal Democratic Party had changed, and the people had changed as well. I also observed that various common frameworks of international politics surrounding Japan and China had changed. I spoke about various factors on that occasion. In the end, I think my explanation was that the problem had arisen because although the overall structure had changed, the network supporting that structure had weakened.

What that means, I think, is that if top-level ties are restored, bilateral relations to an extent will quickly return to normal. However, that does not mean that as a result Japan-China relations would stabilize as a whole. If that were the case, I am sure you all would probably lose interest in the topic. I think there are several essential issues, and now they are moving in the direction of improvement. We can probably say that bilateral relations have begun to make up for five lost years.

I would now like to divide the problem broadly into two parts. First, I will explain the background that made the summit talks possible in terms of the domestic political process in China. And second, I will talk about Prime Minister Abe’s visit to China from the logic of the Japanese side. The North Korea problem is entwined in these processes in various ways. First of all, let us consider from the perspective of the logic of China’s domestic politics. This is related to the strengthening of the leadership of President Hu. Criticism of the sudden improvement in relations with Japan and the deterioration of the relationship between China and North Korea is quite strong in China. That is to say, in relations with Japan, the issue of Yasukuni Shrine was not made a condition for the summit exchange. At the same time, criticism of Hu for losing China’s influence over North Korea was quite strong, and it still exists to an extent. However, as a result of the power struggle within the party, I think Hu is suddenly beginning to establish his authority. I believe that Abe’s visit to China had quite a large impact in this process of consolidating power. Putting it simply, in terms of the seizure of power in domestic politics and in diplomacy, since relations with Japan were the largest pending issue in China’s diplomacy, Hu can be said to have made a final decision in this area.

My specialty is keeping a watch on politics in China, and I know that the most important event in China for the time being is going to be next year’s 17th Party Congress. In the case of Jiang Zemin as well, he took power in 1989, but actually it was about seven or eight years before he had a tight grip on power in the real sense. In the end I think that it was only around 1995, 1996, or 1997 that he really got a firm hold on the reins of government. It took time to gain control of the party and especially of the military, and Deng Xiaoping was a very powerful figure. It was only after Deng’s death that Jiang was finally able to establish his authority. In other words, Hu became the top person in the Chinese Communist Party in 2002, but he still does not have complete power. The reason is that, looking at the nine top members of the CCP, there are still quite a few who belong to the Jiang faction. In terms of the logic of politics, this is natural. In a sense, it is only natural that Jiang does not want to lose his power base even after his resignation. Conversely speaking, from Hu’s point of view, for a long time he has been unable to develop his own policies, but he has been consolidating his power little by little. Thinking ahead to next year’s party congress, if a direction could not be shown to an extent at the sixth plenum of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party that opened on October 8, he would not be able to make preparations for next year’s 17th Party Congress. In fact, if Hu does not properly announce a successor at next year’s party congress---conversely speaking, if he does not tidy up his complex relationship with Jiang---he will not be able to hand over power smoothly to his chosen successor at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, when he will resign. In China the lifetime system for the top leader has been abolished; now the president can stay on for two five-year terms.

Ahead of the sixth plenum of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party, Chen Liangyu, the secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, was arrested. I think that this was a kind of coup d’etat. Of course, Hu is the top person, so it might be strange to call it a coup. But I think it was a kind of coup within the power setup. Chen was scheduled to see that the Shanghai World Exposition in 2010 is successful and then join the ranks of the top leadership in 2012. He was a person who, if everything went well, could have climbed to the very top. There were various rumors about him, and in the end he was arrested. Within this process, various scandals have also arisen implicating Huang Ju, who is quite a powerful leader in the CCP. Recently the director of the National Bureau of Statistics of China was arrested. And in today’s International Herald Tribune there is a report about a scandal involving Liu Ji, secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, and one of the top leaders behind him, Jia Qinglin. These are all members of the Jiang Zemin group, the so-called Shanghai Group, and the fact is that their power base is now weakening very rapidly. This all happened in September and October, and then there was the sixth plenum, and Prime Minister Abe was welcomed on the first day of that plenary session. I think it is correct to say that this marks the sudden beginning of Hu’s consolidation of power. Actually, the same thing happened in the days of Jiang Zemin. In 1995 the mayor of Beijing was arrested, and in 1997 Qiao Shi, who was Jiang’s biggest rival, was forced to resign. Generally speaking, that is the pattern of Chinese politics.

Next I would like to talk a little about Hu’s diplomacy. I think that he began to actively develop a kind of anti-Jiang diplomacy, a diplomacy that was different from Jiang’s, from about 2003. There were two factors. One was the Taiwan problem, and the other was China’s policy toward North Korea. Simply speaking, the Taiwan problem was the top priority issue in the Jiang era, but Hu turned this priority issue into a long-term issue. In addition, relating to this Taiwan problem, various things occurred, such as Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s leaning toward independence, but in a sense an ironic phenomenon occurred in that Chen’s demonstration of a pro-independence bent led to an improvement in China-US relations. So, speaking from an extremely realistic perspective, it can perhaps be said that China was helped quite a lot by President Chen in the improvement of its ties with the United States. From America’s point of view, naturally the Iraq and terrorist problems and the Iran problem are more important, so it does not want another big conflict to occur in Asia. So the irony was that reconciliation between the United States and China came about because of this factor.

The other theme is North Korea. The six-party talks began in 2003. Simply speaking, the meaning of the six-party talks is that, with regard to policy toward North Korea, basically China is moving in step with the United States. Perhaps you have forgotten, but actually there was no summit-level exchange between China and North Korea for seven years from 1992 to 1999. The reason was that North Korea was extremely angry about China’s normalization of diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992. In the end, various things happened after that. For example, China and North Korea considered building a special economic zone in the northern part of North Korea, but then China arrested the Chinese-Dutch businessman Yang Bin who Pyongyang had tapped to head the economic zone. That was in 2002, I think. In that way, relations between China and North Korea were complicated when the six-party talks got off to a start. It was then that the complex linkage with the Taiwan problem actually became an issue at the six-party talks. I don’t have time to talk about this matter today, but anyway it was an extremely complicated connection. As I stated earlier, I think that basically China if anything was moving in step with America in these talks. Quite a lot of information has leaked about China often being criticized by North Korea in these talks.

For your reference, I would like to add that Hu’s influence in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also limited. The reason is that Hu has only ever worked in the party, so his influence over government organizations is weak. That was why he moved [Vice Foreign Minister] Dai Bingguo from the party to the Foreign Ministry, but that was not enough. I think that [State Councillor and former Foreign Minister] Tang Jiaxuan has actually used his influence to block this move. Since I don’t have time to talk about these complicated matters today, I will say no more. Also, for example, regarding the problem of money laundering as well, I think that China actually was applying a certain amount of pressure in such places as Macao from around the fall of 2005. Anyway, what I want to say is that together with the domestic policy of scrapping the growth-is-everything line and building a harmonious society, in diplomacy as well the Hu administration has shifted the Taiwan problem to a long-term issue and has begun to fall in line with Western countries, for example in its policy toward North Korea. I think this is quite a change from the Jiang line.

In China’s relations with Japan as well, I think that Hu so far has been sending signals in various ways. In terms of the improvement of relations with Japan, Hu has made the least mention of the Yasukuni Shrine issue. In that sense, he has been quite careful about relations with Japan, but maybe the Japanese side has not properly grasped this point.

So far I have been talking about China, but now I would like to speak about Japan. Regarding the question of why Prime Minister Abe’s visit to China was possible this time, I think that quite a lot of time was spent in preparing for the visit. I think he understood that if he clarified his position on the Yasukuni Shrine issue, the biggest problem in relations between Japan and China, everything would collapse. In the end, the question was who on the Chinese side could make a decision on this matter. And finally, after various channels had no doubt been explored, they came down to Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Shotaro Yachi and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo. I think the dialogue between these two persons was everything. Other routes did not really lead to the top, but this route led directly to Hu.

Of course, I don’t know when Prime Minister Abe made the decision to visit China, but the first country that he visited as prime minister was China. Usually Japanese prime ministers make their first overseas trip to the United States, but in Abe’s case it was China. Considering the extremely hawkish statements he had been making until then, the visit had an extremely large impact. I think that when future historians look back on the event, it will be an extremely interesting theme indeed. I don’t know whether he made those hawkish statements before deliberately in order to raise the stakes with the aim of increasing the effect later. But looking at the outcome, I think we can say that Prime Minister Abe has quite a different style from that of Koizumi. That is to say, Koizumi reflected matters of the heart and personal feelings in his diplomacy. The prime minister’s personal thoughts and individual character were projected into foreign affairs. But rather than personal feelings and beliefs, Abe puts the emphasis on national interest and the strategic perspective. In that sense, perhaps it was Koizumi who was not normal, and now things have returned to normal.

Before his visit to China, Prime Minister Abe acknowledged the 1995 statement by then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama clearly apologizing and expressing remorse for Japan’s actions in Asia in the past and also referred to the responsibility of people like his grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, for starting the war. And finally, concerning remarks that his position was completely different from his past statements, he went as far as saying that he “accepted the criticism.” In view of that background, Prime Minister Abe’s biggest concern was probably that his policy toward China would be seen as one of compromise and kowtowing. In the end, it was probably Abe who approached China to say that he wanted China to be the first country he visited, and it was probably President Hu who, in the final coordination of the schedule, decided that the visit should be on October 8. For both President Hu and Prime Minister Abe, holding the summit entailed extremely dangerous risks.

Both leaders had to consider how to soften the repercussions on domestic politics. President Hu was not making Yasukuni a condition for the meeting, so it would be a major advantage for him if they did not talk about the problem of Yasukuni and were ambiguous about the matter. Given the huge risk involved here, President Hu’s determination to improve diplomatic relations with Japan must have been very strong indeed. The same was true for Prime Minister Abe. If his visit to China appeared like a major concession, it would mean that he had blundered immediately after becoming prime minister. Therefore, it was essential for these two leaders to skillfully juggle the extremely dangerous risks involved. In that sense, Abe’s ambiguous Yasukuni strategy was in the interests of both sides. President Hu opened the sixth plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the morning of October 8 and then left that most important meeting in order to meet with Prime Minister Abe. Moreover, he gave Abe a big welcome, treating him like a state guest. Thus, before the sixth plenum President Hu had suddenly tightened his grip on domestic politics through the arrest of Chen Liangyu in Shanghai and so on, and in the afternoon of October 8 he finally consolidated his hold on diplomacy.

Ironically speaking, there was another country that also celebrated this improvement in Japan-China relations. That was North Korea. While Prime Minister Abe was on his way from Beijing to Seoul, North Korea carried out a nuclear test. This event served to further consolidate the relationship between Japan and China, because the problem of North Korea became a common strategic issue for them. When asked upon landing in Seoul what he thought of North Korea’s nuclear test, Prime Minister Abe replied, “We want to respond to this problem in cooperation with the United States and China.” In that sense, there was perhaps a little bit of luck involved. However, I don’t think that this Japan-China relationship has yet been completely formed and solidified. Both sides have more work to do. But nevertheless, after a hiatus of five years, long-awaited exchange has suddenly started to move.

Prime Minister Abe’s wife, Akie, has now become an extremely popular figure in China. I think there is a possibility that this first lady diplomacy might become an unusual feature in Japanese diplomatic history. It is certainly a new phenomenon.

Today I have been unusually optimistic in my tone, but frankly speaking, the relationship between Japan and China is not yet that solid. In China, the top leader has basically consolidated his position, so efforts from now on will be made toward the top-down improvement of relations with Japan. For President Hu, the collapse of Japan-China relations would have repercussions on his own power, so in that sense the question is how he is going to consolidate relations from now on.

Finally, as for Prime Minister Abe, I don’t think there can be any backtracking for him now. Since he has made a move in the direction of improving relations, considering also the huge amount of support for this diplomacy, I don’t think he can go back any more.


QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: [By a Chinese participant] First, will the positive approach being taken by Prime Minister Abe have any impact on thinking toward China and dealing with China within the Liberal Democratic Party? And second, recently a Chinese civil group departed from Hong Kong for the Senkaku isles, and unusually the Chinese government notified the Japanese government beforehand and requested it to ensure their safety. This had not happened before. How do you think it will effect Japan-China relations?
A: First of all, regarding the LDP’s channel to China, I talked about this in detail the last time I gave a briefing here. In the past basically it was the former Tanaka faction in the LDP that took the initiative in Japan’s policy toward China. After that, it was the Takeshita faction, in other words, the Keiseikai. That was the largest faction in the LDP, and for a long time the decisions of that faction generally became the decisions of the LDP. Basically it was this faction that controlled Japan’s China policy. That situation continued up to the Hashimoto faction. In the era of the Hashimoto faction, [former Prime Minister] Ryutaro Hashimoto also had relations with China, but it was Hiromu Nonaka who became the principal key figure in China policy. On the Chinese side, President Jiang was widely disliked in Japan after his visit here in 1998, so it was his right-hand man, Zeng Qinghong, who virtually managed relations with Japan. So at that time relations between Japan and China followed the Nonaka-Zeng line. However, within the LDP, Nonaka retired, and Koizumi set about breaking the Hashimoto faction. As a result, Japan’s strongest connection with China collapsed. Since Koizumi’s talk about destroying the LDP actually meant destroying the old Keiseikai, the network with China was also lost as a result. In China as well, as a result of the transfer of power to President Hu, there were efforts to shift the focus from Zeng to Hu, but actually the transfer was not fully carried out. That channel has now been reopened by Prime Minister Abe and President Hu. As I said earlier, I think that these two have common interests. In a sense they share the same destiny, so from now on they will most probably make efforts to build relations.
Regarding your second question, thank you very much for calling them the Senkaku isles [they are called the Diaoyu isles in China]. As far as I have heard, today this problem seems to have been resolved. I hear that the Hong Kong boat has already gone back, so the problem has been settled. What happened was that China thought it would be most inconvenient if relations were damaged at this moment. In that sense, I think probably quite a lot of control came from the top in this case. Simply speaking, in both Japan and China there are a lot of people who want to crush the Japan-China relationship. The question is how these forces can be controlled in a diversifying and pluralizing society—and China also is just that, a diversifying and pluralizing society.

Q: I don’t want to darken the bright outlook for relations between Japan and China, but let me ask about Yasukuni. I don’t really understand the agreement between Prime Minister Abe and President Hu concerning Yasukuni. How long can they keep up this ambiguous approach? Will it last until the party congress in China next year, and then Prime Minister Abe will visit Yasukuni? Or will Prime Minister Abe not visit Yasukuni at all?
A: Of course, I don’t know the answer to that question. Nobody knows. But they have reached an understanding that Prime Minister Abe will not say if he will go or not, or if he has gone or not.

Q: But how long will that ambiguous policy last?
A: The ambiguous policy will probably continue for a long time, because President Hu has accepted it as well. I think perhaps the biggest enemy will be the media. If this matter becomes clear, all the premises will collapse.

Q: I have two questions. First, what are the biggest challenges for Japan in its relationship with China now? And second, you spoke about a strategic relationship, which was announced for the first time. What does it mean, this strategic relationship? What problems, not just the North Korea problem, could be solved in this kind of strategic relationship? What are the common interests of both sides?
A: I think there are many. First of all, regarding the question of why the word “strategic” was used, if the word “friendship” were used, when a problem occurred, in the end the only outcome would be that this friendship would be damaged. In other words, friendship means a good relationship has already been built, so it is rather difficult for the two sides to have discussions when their positions differ. That is the kind of relationship that results. In the case of a strategic relationship, the two sides can face each other on common themes. By using this word, I think they changed the Japan-China relationship from a bilateral relationship to a relationship within a multilateral framework.
I think strategic relations cover a lot of fields. In the field of security there is obviously the problem of North Korea. But there are other issues as well, such as the problem of the East China Sea. The two sides have decided on joint development, but there are risks involved, so the question is how this objective of joint development is going to be realized. This is also related to the problem of energy. Furthermore, China’s environmental problem is an issue that involves the whole of Asia. There is the problem of infectious diseases, such as SARS [severe acute respiratory syndrome]. And there are various themes like the financial problem and the problem of poverty in China. Such common themes can be discussed together from now on. Besides these, for example, the problem of the declining birthrate and aging population is a common phenomenon occurring only in Japan, China, and South Korea among the countries of the world, so I think that discussing how to cope with this question, including the issue of social security, would be a good theme.

Q: You spoke about the issue of joint history research. Do you happen to know who will be engaged in this research?
A: For some time various people have been saying that joint history research should be promoted, and in the past former Minister for Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura reached a conclusion with the Chinese side on this matter. Previously, however, there were not many scholars who said they wanted to participate in such joint research. The reason was that joint research would be extremely political and all kinds of difficult problems would be heaped on it. In the end, the participating scholars would probably not know where the bullets were coming from. There was a danger that the bullets would be coming from the direction of domestic politics, which was supposed to be on their side. There were apparently some people who refused when asked to participate.
I think the present case is a little different. I don’t know the content, but joint history research was mentioned in the joint press statement this time, so we can assume that preparations have gone quite a long way. Much groundwork would have been laid for Prime Minister Abe’s visit to China, so we can assume that there is a team within the government and that internal coordination has been conducted on this matter. No information has been leaked, however, so maybe the final members have not yet been decided. But I’m sure that coordination of the content is being carried out within the government. Another problem is that we don’t know who will be involved on the Chinese side. Unless the atmosphere improves a little more, there is a possibility that the people who join the joint research team will become victims. So probably the research will begin only after relations have picked up a little more.
In the case of joint history research between Japan and South Korea, the following approach was taken. The Japanese side wrote from the Japanese perspective, and the South Korean side wrote from the Korean perspective. There has not been much coordination between the two sides. Of course, I hear there was quite a lot of discussion and debate. And in the end the members of the project became friends themselves. Apparently after the research they would go drinking together in the evening. In other words, that is a process of reconciliation. Rather than unifying all of our joint knowledge about history, I think researching jointly and becoming friends itself is one kind of reconciliation process.

* Given on October 27, 2006, at the Foreign Press Center/Japan. This paper is reserved for internal use; any reproduction or quotation is forbidden without prior permission from the FPCJ. 　 ©FPCJ 2006