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Asia-Pacific Journalists Meeting 2003
"ASEAN-Japanese Media
-- Common Issues and Common Challenges"
Terusuke Terada (President, Foreign Press Center/Japan)
Thank you. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to the Ninth Asia-Pacific Journalists Meeting of the Foreign Press Center/Japan. In cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs we have been holding this meeting annually since 1995 and have always managed to find important, timely themes, global as well as regional subjects, to discuss-security problems, economic crisis, women's issues, the information technology age, and last year we discussed new pop culture and lifestyles in Asia. Today our theme is "ASEAN-Japanese Media: Common Issues and Common Challenges."
As you already know, this year is designated as ASEAN-Japan Exchange Year 2003. The coming commemorative summit, which will be held in Tokyo next month, is the crowning event of this exchange year. The summit will be a historic occasion where all the ASEAN leaders will come together outside of the region for the first time. I understand that the Japanese government will announce its unwavering support for ASEAN and will promote a sincere and open partnership with ASEAN to act together and advance together in the new era.
Ladies and gentlemen, it is our pleasure as well as our privilege to be able to organize today's meeting to contribute to ASEAN-Japan Exchange Year 2003 together with many other events being held to give further thrust to the building of the partnership between ASEAN and Japan.
Allow me to take this opportunity to make a brief mention of our organization, the Foreign Press Center, which is aimed at providing a broad range of assistance which may be needed by foreign media in covering and reporting on Japan. We offer our professional assistance not only to about 500 journalists currently working for foreign media in Japan but also to foreign journalists visiting Japan on temporary assignment. Our Center has also been engaged in various activities to promote media understanding of issues facing the Asia-Pacific region. Over the past 25 years, in cooperation with the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association, we have invited around 300 ASEAN journalists to Japan.
The Asia-Pacific Journalists Meeting, in which distinguished journalists discuss regional issues each year, is another of our endeavors in this field-and I believe an important one. Today we have six distinguished panelists here on the stage to exchange views, and their active participation in the discussion will be very much appreciated. We thank all of you for taking the time to attend this very special meeting. We sincerely hope that through your in-depth discussions, mutual recognition as well as understanding of the significance of the Japan-ASEAN relationship will be further deepened.
Ladies and gentlemen, let me ask our managing director, Masahiko Ishizuka, to introduce today's chair and panelists to the audience. Thank you very much.
Masahiko Ishizuka (Managing Director, Foreign Press Center/Japan)
Thank you very much, Mr. Terada, for the introduction. My name is Masahiko Ishizuka. As the managing director of the Foreign Press Center, I would like to extend a warm welcome to you all and look forward to the great success of this daylong meeting to discuss key important issues of the region and media.
To get started, let me introduce the seven distinguished journalists on the panel who are from the major media organizations of the region. First, Mr. Ko Yamaguchi, who is the moderator and chairman of the symposium. He is managing director, International Department, Kyodo News. Mr. Kola Khieu, Board of Directors of the Club of Cambodian Journalists, Cambodia. Mr. Karaniya Dharmasaputra, managing editor, Tempo Newsmagazine, Indonesia. Originally we were supposed to have Mr. Bambang Harymurti, editor-in-chief, Tempo Weekly Newsmagazine and Tempo Daily Newspaper, but because of some urgent personal matter it became impossible for him to come to Japan. So Mr. Karaniya is taking his place. Mr. Hirotsugu Koike, editor-in-chief, the Nikkei Weekly and Nikkei Net Interactive, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, from Japan. Ms. Marites Vitug, editor-in-chief, Newsbreak magazine, from the Philippines. Mr. Janadas Devan, senior writer, The Straits Times, Singapore. And Mr. Don Pathan, regional desk editor, The Nation newspaper, Thailand.
So I leave everything to Mr. Yamaguchi now.
1st Session
Chair (Ko Yamaguchi, Japan)
Thank you, Mr. Ishizuka. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It is a great pleasure for me to open the Ninth Asia-Pacific Journalists Meeting that has been held yearly since 1995. I am Ko Yamaguchi from Kyodo News, and as a journalist with experience of covering Southeast Asia since the 1970s, including the Vietnam War, I'm very happy to be here to chair today's symposium.
I would like to extend a warm welcome to everybody gathered here to participate in this media symposium in which distinguished journalists from the Asia-Pacific region will discuss very important regional and global issues today, as Mr. Terada explained. As part of the events commemorating ASEAN-Japan Exchange year 2003, this year this journalists meeting is being held under the theme "ASEAN-Japanese Media-Common Issues and Common Challenges." This is a very important and difficult title, but we would like to try to have some exchange of good information with each other and try to find some solution for the media cooperation of the Asian countries.
Before going into our first session, I have to ask our speakers to keep to some small rules. I would like to ask them to limit their first remarks to about 20 minutes each, and then maybe 10-15 minutes for each subsequent speech by the panelists. And we would like also to open the floor to the public to ask some questions in a Q&A session.
This morning we explore very important topics of the media's role for the development of the ASEAN region and Japan. So now I would like to start the first session under the title of "How Media in the ASEAN Countries Have Reported on Japan, and Vice Versa, in the Past and Today." I would like to invite Mr. Janadas Devan, senior writer for The Straits Times, Singapore.
Janadas Devan (Singapore)
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by thanking the organizers, the president, the managing director, and the staff of the Foreign Press Center. I am indeed privileged and honored to be here.
As the first speaker, I thought I would speak in broad, general terms to lay out the possible directions the discussion might take.
Every nation's relation with the external world is a function of its own values and interests. Every newspaper's reporting on that external world is similarly constrained despite the best of intentions. Objectivity is always shot through and through by subjectivity, perceptions of values, interests, history, memories. This has little to do, I think, with whether or not a press is free. A free press, of course, will be more likely than an unfree press to be fairer in its reporting about anything, including foreign countries. But it doesn't mean that it will produce reports that are purely objective-whatever that means.
Take, for instance, the New York Times' reporting on Japan. Can one say its reporting on Japan is not filtered by American values and interests? I recall a few years ago in 1998, when I happened to be in Japan, a group of Japanese academics and activists produced a little booklet detailing what they took to be the biases and distortions of the Times then-correspondent in Tokyo, Mr. Nicholas Kristof, now a columnist with the paper. He is, of course, a very fine journalist, and the Times is a remarkable newspaper-in my view, the best in the English-speaking world. But I was fascinated to read the complaints of these Japanese academics and activists and equally fascinated to hear their case when they made a presentation at the International House. They questioned Mr. Kristof's fairness, his politics, what they took to be his sense of cultural superiority. The burden of their charge was that his reporting on Japan reinforced stereotypes, inimical to Japanese women in particular and Japanese society in general.
Here was a newspaper considered liberal in America being accused of fostering a conservative agenda in its reporting on Japan. It was an eye-opener for me, for I had read Mr. Kristof's writings, had admired them, and it never dawned on me that it might be viewed as biased by some Japanese. And these were not reactionary Japanese by any means, but more or less left of center. But the strange thing is, I should not have been surprised. After all, I have found the Times' reporting sometimes on countries I know something about-Singapore, say, or Malaysia, or Indonesia-somewhat off. This is not a matter of factual accuracy. It is not always a matter of cultural superiority. It is just that the view from the outside seemed to me to miss subtleties that someone from the inside would have caught. Can any biography, even a scrupulously fair account, ever be as faithful to a life as an honest autobiography? Of course, one can say an autobiography is subjective, a self-interested account of the self by the self. That is true. But that doesn't mean we get objectivity when we move to biography. That expresses another subjectivity-the biographer's.
Knowing that, I should not have been surprised that Mr. Kristof's reporting was not found objective by many Japanese. But I was surprised, because we all think objectivity is possible where everyone else is concerned except ourselves. I can see when the Times-or the Economist, or the Financial Times-reporting on Singapore, or Malaysia, or some other country is off; that is, some other country I know of is not quite on. But I can't see it when they are reporting on Japan, or Germany, or Nigeria. In those cases I assume they are reporting the truth because I don't know any better.
In this context I was most interested to read yesterday a statement by a New York Times spokeswoman for the revamped International Herald Tribune. As all of you know, the Tribune is now wholly owned by the Times, which bought out the Washington Post's share in the paper and then proceeded to revamp it. On Monday, the day before yesterday, it changed the Tribune's publisher. Mr. Peter Goldmark, the old publisher who was asked to leave by the Times, was reported as saying in the Wall Street Journal that the changes meant that he would be the last publisher of the Tribune as an independent newspaper with its own voice and its own international outlook on the world.
What I found interesting was the response of the Times' spokeswoman to this statement. She said that the IHT had always been a shining example of America's journalistic values of independent objective journalism, to which it adds its own unique international character and voice. Note "America's journalistic values" comes first here before "international character." It's an honest statement of fact, but it reminded me of a sentence in President George W. Bush's national security strategy released in September last year. The U.S. national security strategy, the document said, will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. Imagine how Washington would have responded if China, India, or Japan had said they believe in a distinctly Chinese, Indian, or Japanese internationalism? A Japanese internationalism is an oxymoron, Washington would have correctly noted, a contradiction in terms. Well, the same applies to American internationalism. But all internationalisms, all nationalisms, assume they are the truest expression of internationalism and of universalism, objectivity, and truth.
One can easily see that this is not so from the outside. From the outside, one can see how every other inside is closed in, particular, subjective. But from our own inside, from the point of view of one's own nationalism, one has difficulty seeing that, too, is closed in, particular, and subjective.
I am not saying here that subjectivity is unavoidable, so we might as well resign ourselves to misunderstanding each other. What I'm trying to say is that objective coverage of other cultures and societies is not a simple matter, and one wouldn't make it any simpler by assuming we know what objectivity means and that it is equivalent to one's own world view.
The world is getting smaller, as we have been told repeatedly. We will increasingly live in each other's pockets. But that doesn't mean that mutual understanding will come easily. I think one way to conceive of foreign reporting is to see it as a merging of horizons. One's own values, interests, and histories constitute one horizon. The other's values, interests, and histories constitute another. The objectivity is not available in either horizon, or in their eradication-which is an impossibility-but in their merging and their interaction. This won't happen unless there are exchanges-like this-unless we read each other, let others speak in their own voice so we learn to decipher the limits of one's own horizon and read the contours of the other.
Now, despite all of our faults, I think there may be a better chance of this happening in many Asian countries than in many Western countries, especially the United States. Pick up any major Asian daily-the Asahi Shimbun, The Straits Times (my paper), or The Hindu-you'll often see in these papers articles and commentaries by others, by foreigners. By contrast, pick up a major Western daily-the Financial Times, the London Times, the Washington Post. How often does one see in these papers articles and commentaries by foreigners? Very rarely.
My newspaper, The Straits Times, and my country Singapore have often been accused by the Western press as being insular, illiberal, and authoritarian. I wouldn't categorically deny any of these charges. Singapore is not as perfect as some Singaporeans think. And my newspaper can improve. But I would say this: Anyone reading The Straits Times has a better chance of being well-informed about the world than someone reading even the New York Times.
The reason is simple. A huge portion of the paper is devoted to foreign news. Partly, we have no choice. Singapore is such a small country, it can't possibly produce huge quantities of news about itself every day. We would have a very thin paper indeed if we devoted ourselves only to Singapore news. But partly it is also a conscious decision. We know that events in China, Japan, or Indonesia will have as much impact, if not more so, on Singapore's future than events in Singapore itself. That is why the paper has bureaus in all of the major Asian cities, including Tokyo, as well as in Europe and the United States.
Now let me say something of how we have reported, or failed to report, on Japan. As I had said before, the foreign reporting of any newspaper is a reflection of its own perceptions of values and interests. Over the past three or four decades there have been three distinct strains in the reporting of Japan. Up to, I would say, the late 1960s, Japan was seen as a threat; 1970 to around 1995, Japan was seen as a savior; 1995 until the present, Japan was a disappointment. These are rough dates more or less corresponding to the following stages of Japan's postwar history: Its rise from devastation to economic prominence symbolized by the 1964 Olympic Games, Japan's role as the engine of industrialization in Southeast Asia, when Japanese FDI flowed into the region from the late 1960s onwards, and the post-bubble slump of the Japanese economy, when Japan began to be perceived as part of the problem, not the solution, in East Asia.
In the first phase up to roughly 1970, reporting on Japan never forgot the Second World War. There were many people around with first-hand experiences of the atrocities that Japanese imperial forces committed in Singapore and Malaya between 1942 and 1945. Memories were still fresh and raw, and the view of Japan, especially in the Chinese-language press but also in the English, was suspicious to say the least.
A major shift occurred in the 1970s, fueled in part by growing Japanese investment in the region and in part by domestic political ideology. The same thing that happened in Singapore later happened in Malaysia, especially after Dr. Mahathir Mohamad assumed the premiership of the country in the early 1980s, and perhaps also in Thailand. The industrialization of all of these countries-Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand-it should not be forgotten was impelled to an enormous extent by Japanese investments. With those investments came an ideology of development, among them state direction of the economy, emphasis on savings, investments in education, and a stress on social harmony as the basis of rapid growth. By the time someone of my generation, born in the 1950s or early 1960s, came of age in the 1970s, Japan had become the model of development for much of Southeast Asia-an idea best expressed by the flying geese model of economic growth, with Japan as the lead goose and everyone sort of following in a V-shape back and behind.
So we had Dr. Mahathir's Look East Policy. So we had the Asian values that Singapore officials promoted. We had numerous articles and stories of how Japanese corporations conducted industrial relations, how frugal and thrifty Japanese were, how extraordinarily prescient Japan's Ministry of Trade and Industry, or MITI, was in picking winners, and so on. Japan had quality control circles, zero-defect production, just-in-time supply chains. So we had them, too, with the government promoting these concepts and the newspapers advertising them. Japanese firms in Singapore began the day with calisthenics, exercise. So that, too, became the model for other firms. Japanese managers went down to the factory floor dressed in overalls. So that was upheld as an example of how managers in all firms should conduct themselves in contrast to the stiff-necked and class-conscious British managers that we were used to. In the 1970s even the trade unions in Singapore took the extraordinary step of reorganizing themselves into Japanese-style industrial unions, abandoning the huge, multipurpose unions that the British had bequeathed Singapore and the rest of the colonies. Those were the days of Japan as number one. And if you wish to be in the running, you jogged along on the trail that Japan had blazed.
If I might be allowed a personal reflection here, I can best illustrate the dramatic change in perceptions of Japan in Southeast Asia by recalling my own father's biography. He was a leading trade unionist in Singapore from the 1950s through the 1980s. He first came to political consciousness during the war, when disgust with Japanese occupation led him to cooperate with the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army, which was a communist-led resistance movement. But by the 1970s he had fallen in love totally with Japan and had become an advocate of modeling industrial development on Japan's example. He visited Japan more often than he did any other country besides Malaysia, our closest neighbor, far more often than Britain or the United States, trying to learn how industrial relations were conducted here and importing the lessons to Singapore. Newspapers in the region registered the same shift, reflecting the perceptions in Singapore's case of its political establishment. In the 1990s these perceptions were slowly abandoned as post-bubble Japan sunk into a decade of low or no growth. Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, significantly no Singapore official has breathed a word about Asian values. Newspapers which used to be filled with reports of why Japan was number one now diligently explain why it is ailing. Newspapers which used to be filled with reports in the 1970s and 1980s of why the U.S. is a declining economy, or was a declining economy, now diligently explain why it is such a vibrant and dynamic country.
An obscure American professor, for example, publishes a book on "the rise of the creative class" explaining why homosexuals, for example, in San Francisco signaled an openness that creative computer programmers and others found attractive, thus fueling the development of Silicon Valley. The Singapore newspapers report such findings immediately, and the Singapore government announces a new policy of tolerance towards homosexuals in the civil service. Japan's stocks have declined and America's have risen in the past decade, literally not just figuratively. And newspapers have merely reflected, at least in Singapore, these shifts in perceptions.
To sum up, Asian reporting on Japan is self-reflective. Because Japan was the first Asian country to industrialize, it became a sort of mirror for other Asians. We see in you reflections of ourselves, idealized when things are going well here in Japan but when things are not-examples of what to be when Japan was number one, examples of what to avoid when it was no longer number one. This is your fate. We can discuss later what sort of shortcomings, if any, this has led to the reporting on Japan, and we can also discuss how Japanese newspapers see the rest of Asia.
If Japan is a mirror for "Asia ex-Japan," as financial analysts call the rest of Asia, what is Asia ex-Japan to Japan? Its past, its fearsome future, what? What will the merging of horizons I mentioned earlier look like?
Thank you.
Chair
Thank you, Mr. Janadas Devan. Thank you very much for your very insightful analysis of the historical background between ASEAN and Japan, and also the subjectivity and objectivity of journalism, and about newspaper reporting. Also, you mentioned about the three different periods of the relationship between Japan and Asia, citing the date of the threat until 1970, and since 1970 you mentioned Japan as a savior for Asia, and after 1995 a kind of disappointment.
Given such a historical background analysis, I would like to also invite Mr. Hirotsugu Koike, editor-in-chief of The Nikkei Weekly and Nikkei Net Interactive. Please, Mr. Koike, your presentation.
Hirotsugu Koike (Japan)
Thank you.Thank you very much, Mr. Yamaguchi. And thank you very much, Mr. Terada and Mr. Ishizuka, for the kind invitation for me to participate in this exciting event.
I remember it was 1985, when I was a correspondent based in Singapore covering Southeast Asia, that I met Mr. Terada. It was the first time for me, and we discussed about the future of Asia, I remember. And Mr. Ishizuka, I worked with him at the Nikkei company. And also he and I were in charge of the Asian countries, so we discussed a lot of things about Asia. I am very happy to be here with all of you.
It is my second time to participate in this symposium. The first time was five or six years ago, right after the financial crisis in Asia, and the atmosphere was very pessimistic. But now, thanks to the economic recovery of the United States and Europe and Asian countries, we are kind of becoming optimistic about the future of Asia.
In this session I would like to speak about how changes in the international trend have influenced Japanese media reporting on ASEAN countries, the tasks Japanese news companies are facing, and what kind of policies the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, the newspaper that I work for, has regarding reporting on ASEAN. And possibly I would finally like to touch upon how to work together; I mean, how Japanese news media and ASEAN news media can work together in the future.
First of all, I would like to mention about my experience as an overseas correspondent based in Singapore. I was assigned as an overseas correspondent in 1985. I think 1985 was kind of an epoch-making year. Probably you remember, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev came to power as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Then the Soviet Union still existed. And more importantly, at least for the Japanese business community, an accord was signed, and the appreciation of the Japanese yen against the U.S. dollar began to be accelerated. And then, because of the currency adjustment, Japanese companies shifted their production bases to Asia.
So since 1985 Japanese media have focused on the economic integration or economic interaction between ASEAN and Japan, because of some shift of the production base of Japanese companies to Asian countries, especially ASEAN countries. And also, since 1985, let me divide up the period after 1985. The second half of the 1980s, from 1985 Japanese companies began to shift their production bases to Asian countries. Then up to the 1990s we were very optimistic about the future of Asia, because of the economic recovery of the Asian countries, which was also reflected in the Japanese economy. Many people talked about the future as the Asian era, or something like that.
And in the next period, the first half of the 1990s, I remember international relations were changed dramatically because of the end of the Cold War. It was declared in 1989. We Japanese media had many things to cover related to the end of the Cold War. For example, the fall of the Berlin Wall and then the so-called democratic revolution in Eastern Europe, and then the disintegration of the Soviet Union. So there were a lot of things for the Japanese media to cover. And then it seems to me that the attention paid to ASEAN countries has decreased. And also we were very much interested in what's going on in China. Because of the opening-up policy of the Chinese leadership, the Chinese economy has developed very rapidly.
And then some kind of concept become commoner: the APEC concept. This stands for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. I remember in 1983, when I was in Washington D.C. as a correspondent, that year the APEC summit was held for the first time thanks to the leadership of Bill Clinton, president of the United States.
As I mentioned to you, our focus was on not only Asia but also Europe and the United States, and Asia-Pacific as a whole. One more thing I have to mention is some kind of rising tension, so that there were a lot of things to cover for Japanese media. That was in the first half of the 1990s.
In the second half of the 1990s the Japanese news media began to pay more attention to ASEAN countries again, but this time because of the currency crisis. It started in 1997 in Thailand. However, in 2000 the Japanese focus shifted to economic development between Japan and China. I think that kind of tendency has continued in the Japanese media.
When we think about Japanese reporting on ASEAN, several evaluation standards can be used. First of all, whether or not the quality and quantity of coverage is adequate, and whether or not there are sufficient local bureaus. And thirdly, whether or not reporters have adequate knowledge of local conditions, etc.
Let me explain about Nihon Keizai Shimbun's coverage, my company. Probably as some of you know, the Nikkei Group publishes five newspapers: Its flagship newspaper is called Nihon Keizai Shimbun, shortly Nikkei, the same as the company's name. One of our sister newspapers is called Nikkei Business Daily. And thirdly, Nikkei Financial Daily, Nikkei Marketing Journal, and Nikkei Weekly, which is an English weekly. The Nikkei group is putting a lot of weight on reporting on Asia. For example, since 1995 we have held international annual conferences on the future of Asia with the participation of ASEAN intellectuals and also leadership. Nikkei, our flagship newspaper, has an Asia-Pacific news page once a week. And also Nikkei Weekly, which I am in charge of, has a China page and also an Asia page. And through those pages we are focusing mostly on the economic development and political development of the ASEAN countries.
As for the bureau, I remember when I worked in Singapore as an overseas correspondent covering Asia, I was covering not only Singapore but also Malaysia and the Philippines, because then we didn't have any office in Kuala Lumpur or Manila. But now we assign one correspondent to almost each of the ASEAN countries, and we have a Manila bureau and a Kuala Lumpur bureau, too. So the number of correspondents covering the ASEAN countries has been increasing very dramatically. As a major Japanese media company, the Nikkei Group will try to continually improve the quality and quantity of the ASEAN coverage.
Finally, I would like to talk about a task that media in Japan and ASEAN countries are facing and how to promote mutual cooperation between them. The biggest issue now, from my point of view, is how to deal with the information revolution, especially the rapid diffusion of the Internet. How will the advent of the Internet affect traditional media like newspapers and TV? Probably this is a challenge that all media companies around the world are facing. Probably I will give more details in the third session on how I believe the news media in Japan and ASEAN countries should work closely together to exchange information to ensure accurate understanding of the present and ongoing development in information technology.
And lastly, international relations are changing, leaving their mark on East Asia and ASEAN and Japan, and it is impossible for one company to cover everything. I think Japanese and ASEAN media companies will have to cooperate in various fields in the future, such as exchanging articles and training reporters.
Thank you very much.
Chair
Thank you, Mr. Koike, for your distinguished analysis and also your background explanation about Japan's media coverage of ASEAN affairs.
Now I would like to ask the panelists who are here at the table and also the audience that is here again to share some of the common views or some differences of opinions. I think Mr. Devan, you had a very polemical presentation about Japan's role or Japan's standpoint, and also for the Western media or Asian media, or the media in Singapore and the media, quite influential media like the Washington Post, the differences of the news articles or the contributors. You mentioned also American internationalism and Japanese internationalism. One is international, from the American side or Japan's side, or from the ASEAN side. Sometimes the definition of internationalism could be different. Also you mentioned about your father's generation's expectations to Japan, and now the disappointment in these 10 years. I would like to ask our panelists, do you have any comments on Mr. Devan's comments? Mr. Pathan, how about your comments on this?
Don Pathan (Thailand)
Thank you.What was said about the perception, sometimes there is a difference between perceptions and reality. I would like to bring one example that I discussed with a colleague last night about perception and reality.
One example is that some years ago, I think in late 1997, Japan-U.S. defense guidelines, for example, a lot of the headlines and reactions came from Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo, which was understandable. But there were other reactions that did not make headlines, which I think were maybe not just as important, but still important. There was some discussion in Thailand about that, about what's the take on it. And surprisingly, well, to some of us it was surprising, and this is not so in ASEAN, a lot of the policy planners or defense planners kind of quietly welcome it. They couldn't come out publicly and say, yes, it was a good thing. And when you start talking, why is it that you support something like this? And the response, it has to do with the China angle. Interestingly, these are U.S.-Japan defense guidelines. And some of the response was, well, as long as China is the way it is-meaning that it doesn't give importance or great consideration to issues like transparency with its military expansion, its desire to become a blue navy-something like this should be welcomed. I think my point, to make a long story short, is that since '95, when ASEAN came out with a collective position on China, it has been a turning point on how ASEAN and Thailand view Japan, and often it is in light of China. And I think this part right here, I think when we look at our reports, this trend, I think, should be taken into consideration as well.
Chair
.Thank you, Mr. Pathan. Is there any other panelist who would like to make a comment on this? Okay, Ms. Vitug, please.
Marites Vitug (The Philippines)
Thank you.I'd like to ask a question for Mr. Koike. Can I do that? I was quite struck by the periods you mentioned about Japan's coverage of ASEAN. I would just like to know, during the recession, how has Japan covered ASEAN? I understand that because of a lack of resources, some of the Japanese bureaus in various capitals of ASEAN have pulled out. So how do they cover the rest of the world, at least in ASEAN? Do you rely on wire stories? And has this lessened interest in foreign affairs?
Koike
Thank you very much for your interesting questions. I hope I understand accurately your question. Your question is how the recession of the Japanese economy has affected the Japanese media's coverage of international affairs, including ASEAN. Right? Actually, as for the company I am working for, Nikkei, has never reduced the number of its overseas correspondents so dramatically. Of course, we have restructured overseas bureaus, but we have never reduced the number of overseas correspondents. This is first.
And as for the reliance on newswire, we subscribe to Kyodo News, and also AP and Reuters. And that kind of reliance and dependence is not changed. And so, in short, I really don't think the recession of the Japanese economy has affected the coverage of the Japanese media on international issues. Probably Mr. Yamaguchi will have some different opinion, I don't know.
Chair
Thank you, Mr. Koike. Ms. Vitug, I would like to give you some reference information which could be good for understanding. According to the Foreign Press Center's recent 2003 book about international news coverage, the Japanese correspondents who are in ASEAN countries: Cambodia, 3; Indonesia, 11; Malaysia, 5; Philippines, 11; Singapore, 13; Thailand, 35; Vietnam, 4. A total of 82 correspondents are now working in ASEAN countries from Japan. This is Japanese correspondents. And also from ASEAN countries we receive correspondents in Japan. According to the FPC's statistics, we have a total of 22 ASEAN journalists working in Japan and reporting from Japan: Cambodia, 1; Indonesia, 5; Singapore, 12; Thailand, 1; and Vietnam, 3. I don't know how to evaluate these numbers. But 22 versus 82, I think the Japanese correspondents in Asia, their level or activities never decreased in the 1990s or after 2000. And also recent changes are many local or native reporters and journalists are working together with Japanese journalists. Some are stringers, and some are information providers. But I think that the relationship between the local journalists and Japanese correspondents is growing more and more familiar. And, of course, they exchange opinions with each other.
Do we have any other comments from panelists? Mr. Koike, please.
Koike
Thank you.As for the coverage of the Japanese media on international issues, one thing I would like to tell you is that we have increased the number of correspondents based in China and reduced the correspondents in Washington D.C. and also ASEAN countries the past five or six years. But it is not because of the recession of the Japanese economy, but the rising interest in China. Many people in Japan are very much interested in what's going on in China. That's the main reason.
Thank you.
Chair
Thank you.Going back for some historical overview of the Japan and ASEAN media relationship, do you have any other comments from the panelists? Mr. Devan, would you like to add something else to your comments? Okay, if there are no special comments from the panelists, I would like to open the floor to the audience. Do you have any comments or any questions about the discussions we had between Mr. Koike and Mr. Devan? Please raise your hand, and the microphone will be delivered to you. Any question or any comments from the floor? Okay, please, Mr. Karaniya.
Karaniya Dharmasaputra (Indonesia)
Thank you.I would just like to put two questions to Mr. Devan. I think you haven't mentioned yet whether you believe the occupation by Japan in ASEAN countries in World War II still affects ASEAN media in these recent years. I think in Indonesia the jugun ianfu compensation is still a really interesting issue for our media. How do you see this? And the second is, how do you think the ASEAN media perceives the so-called competition between Japan and China to take an economic, political, and security leadership in the region?
Thank you.
Devan
Thank you.Where the Second World War is concerned, memories differ from country to country and within countries among different races. In Singapore, because an overwhelming majority of Singaporeans are of Chinese ethnic origin, memories of the war have a greater presence, not so much among the younger generation, but among people of the older generation, large numbers of people still remember the war. It is still an issue. In Malaysia you find differences among the races, because it is a fact that the Japanese occupation inflicted far more suffering among ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia than among people of Malay origin. In the Philippines, I think memories of the war are still fairly strong, because there was a large indigenous resistance movement in the Philippines. And that resistance movement fed into the self-definition of national identity in the Philippines. In Indonesia, I'm not so sure, but I would be surprised if memory of the war is as persistent in Indonesia as it is in either the Philippines or Singapore and Malaysia.
Now, is it an issue? Yes. Automatically, whenever Japan gives signs of assuming a greater military role, there are automatic and sometimes knee-jerk reactions to this in both the mass media as well as among the political establishment. But as Don suggested a while ago, there is a curious disjunction here. You have to say something in public, because that is what is expected of you. But the private perceptions of the establishment, political establishment especially, may differ from the public expressions for a very simple reason-the overwhelming fact of China and the looming presence of China. So perceptions of Japan's security posture in East Asia and the wider Pacific region is a function of people's perceptions of China.
Especially in Southeast Asia there is a perception, or people know-in fact, people have said so-senior leaders like Mr. Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore have said so, that no possible combination of powers in East Asia can hope to balance China. So if such a perception can be recognized in Singapore, which is largely a Chinese majority country, you can imagine the perception in the rest of Southeast Asia.
So there are two things where the Second World War is concerned. One, there is continuing memory and the pain of memory, especially among the older generation. But history is never static. I mean, history is always moving. So one's perception of Japan's role, it's not quite clear what Japan's role is, is going to be, in the security of the Pacific region. I mean, I don't know whether the Japanese know, let alone East Asians. It is also a function of other developments. It is also a function of what people perceive. It is the geopolitical situation in 20-30 years as China grows. That's the first question. What's the other question? I forgot.
Chair
Thank you, Mr. Janadas Devan. I think that is now a very exciting point about the new perception for the ASEAN or for Asia about the emerging China, and also Japan, what it should be.
And Mr. Koike, I have some questions for you, if it's possible. According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Japan is the greatest trading partner, on a par with the United States, for ASEAN. Japan's share is about 20.2 percent; United States, 21 percent. And Japan is the greatest extra-territorial investor, I mean, from outside of ASEAN, the investment is the biggest. And I think the total of Japan's share is 21.6 percent, and the amount is $49.5 billion in value. And also according to the Foreign Ministry, Japan is the country which is applying the greatest bilateral ODA to the ASEAN countries. And I think about 3.7 million Japanese people travel to ASEAN. This is the maximum numbers for the tourists in ASEAN. Japan's presence as such, is seen from these figures. But also, as Mr. Devan mentioned in his presentation, Japan's image or presence after 1990 in these 10 years of Japan's economic sluggishness, and the image of Japan, has changed. And China's presence and China's image is emerging. They are seeing a new leadership, and a new China economic development. What do you think, Mr. Koike, about this kind of change or perception gap in the ASEAN countries?
Koike
Thank you.Last night we had dinner, and we had a very interesting discussion about a lot of issues related to the Asian countries. I am the only Japanese on the panel, so I assumed there would be a lot of questions to me. Anyway, I am not speaking on behalf of the Japanese government or Nikkei company, but I would just like to give you my personal opinion.
It is not surprising, I would say, it is quite natural that the people outside Japan have been disappointed with the recent performance of the Japanese economy, because the Japanese economy has a lot of influence on Asian countries, including ASEAN countries, as Mr. Yamaguchi mentioned.
As for the rivalry between China and Japan, my personal opinion is that it is quite natural to see the emerging of China. And I wouldn't be surprised if the Chinese economy will be number one in size in the world, because look at the population, 1.3 billion people. It's very natural to see China as a number one economic power. As a Japanese, I really hope that Japan as a whole will cooperate with China to form or integrate the region economically and politically to maintain the peace and security of the region, and also the prosperity of the entire regional economy.
Probably we will discuss this issue this afternoon, but let me mention just briefly. I think it is also very natural to see the integration of East Asian countries economically and politically. I don't know the pace of development, but in the future I foresee a kind of integration. For well-balanced integration, political and economic integration of the region, what is important is to have a good relation between two regional powers such as China and Japan. Still there is a lot of resentment. We have to definitely cooperate with each other for stability and prosperity in the region. And so we should overcome the historical problem between the two countries. There are a lot of things for Japanese people to do. But I really hope the Chinese people will understand about the importance of cooperation between the two countries, not only for us but for the entire region. Am I answering your questions?
Chair
Thank you.Thank you. Yes, please, Mr. Devan, for your comment.
Devan
Thank you.The question as I understand it is, how does one explain the disparity between Japan's preponderant economic presence in Southeast Asia and its intellectual and political influence? Now, there is a huge disparity. Compared to America, for example, let's speak specifically about what happened in 1997-98. This was the Asian financial crisis. Japan's investments in Indonesia far exceeded American investments in Indonesia. Japan's investments in Thailand far exceeded U.S. investments in Thailand. Japanese banks were far more exposed in South Korea than U.S. banks. In fact, the U.S. Treasury Secretary Bob Rubin decided to intervene in the crisis when the South Korean economy began shaking not because U.S. banks were directly affected but because U.S. banks' exposure in Japan and Japan's banks' exposure in South Korea might have caused a ricochet effect on the U.S. economy. So American exposure was far less. But where did the intellectual and policy influence come from? It was, in fact, the United States calling the shots in the response.
And this is a very puzzling thing. I mean, Japan, despite 10 years of slow growth, is still the second largest economy in the world by far. And in many respects it is more globalized than the United States, for trade constitutes a larger percentage of Japanese GDP than U.S. GDP. And, as you pointed out, Japan gives far more in ODA than the United States. But the United States has an enormous what Joseph Nye of Harvard calls "soft power." My definition of soft power or the monopoly of soft power is, you argue both sides of the issue. Who makes the argument for globalization? America. Who makes the argument against globalization? Also Americans. You have the U.S. establishment and U.S. multinationals, and so on, and think tanks. And within the U.S. establishment you have people like Joseph Stiglitz, Sachs, and so on, who make the argument against globalization. This is what is the definition of monopoly power. You are both the establishment and the opposition to the establishment.
And Japanese influence, first of all, is not as commensurate with its economic presence because of this soft power. In this context, let me give you a specific example why this happens, one reason why it happens. The Asian crisis, again, in 1997-98, one of the most productive ideas and suggestions to have emerged in that crisis came from the then vice-minister of finance in Japan, Mr. Eisuke Sakakibara. He had proposed the creation of an Asian monetary fund separate from the International Monetary Fund. He went around Southeast Asia in 1997-98, and he got a lot of support from governments in Southeast Asia, certainly from Singapore, Malaysia, etc. All supported the idea. And then, of course, he went to Washington. Bob Rubin and Larry Summers said no, and the idea was dropped.
So there are two things. The Japanese intellectual leadership in Southeast Asia is constrained by its alliance with the United States. That's first. Secondly, again, let me speak in specific terms. When Japanese newspapers and the media report on Southeast Asia or Asia, who do you report for? You report to Japanese audience, right? Now, what does CNN report for? What does the New York Times report for? I mean, actually it is just Americans, but they think they are reporting for the world.
Now that is a crucial distinction. And there are many reasons for this. One, the English language. I mean, this extraordinary event organized here in Japan, and we are all speaking-what is the common tongue between all of us? -it is English. That's one reason.
And the other, much more deeper, is the assumption of universality in Western culture, at this stage of Western culture, as compared to any other culture in the world, including Japanese culture. You do not assume that Japanese culture is universal. Americans, American culture, and Europeans assume that what is the essence of American culture is universal. The "we" in the American Constitution actually stands for the whole world - "We, the people...."
So these two distinctions. In answer to your question, why isn't Japan's influence commensurate with its economic preponderance in Southeast Asia? There is no comparison between Japanese investments and U.S. investments. Japanese aid in Southeast Asia-Japanese exposure of Japanese banks in Southeast Asia-and American banks, there clearly is no comparison. And I think there are two reasons. One; Japan's alliance with America. In other words, that is the primary relationship. And, two; the fact that Japanese culture doesn't assume that it is universal.
Chair
Thank you, Mr. Devan. This is a very polemical but important point you cited. And I think that if you have any comment from the floor, I would like to ask for your comments or questions, or other panelists. Mr. Devan mentioned about the soft power of Japan or the soft power of the United States, the intellectual influence or intellectual understanding with each other, and how to share the views, how to work together. Of course, English is the means of the language, the English language as such. And it is used now more or less already as kind of the common language tool for all of the global, intellectual world. But also from Japan's side, the dissemination of the information from Japan is far behind compared with the United States or Europe. And I mentioned 82 Japanese correspondents in Southeast Asia or ASEAN countries, but mainly they write in Japanese for Japanese newspapers and Japanese TV. I think a very small percentage of that news is translated or directly turned into English and dispatched. From the Kyodo News, the news agency, we have 24-hour English-language services, and we disseminate I think more than 200-300 news items a day. Half of them are from Asia, but this is still not enough compared with AP or Reuters or AFP. In that sense, the reporting from Asia in English and with a Japanese viewpoint or Asian viewpoints are not enough. This could be one factor for Mr. Devan's comments.
And also the other thing which I would like to ask the floor or panelists: the definition of international or how to regard the current Asian societies, how to view the Japanese way of internationalism or the ASEAN way of internationalism. The image is quite different, as Mr. Devan mentioned. Mr. Koike or Mr. Pathan, or Mr. Khieu, do you have any comments on this? Or do you have any other comments from the floor?
Koike
Thank you.I would like to comment on the soft power which Joe Nye of Harvard University proposed. I agree there are three or four points which Janadas raised. As for the U.S.-Japan security alliance and the soft power which Japan seems to look for, the one point I would like to note is that the soft power of the United States, or American soft power, has prevailed and is so influential in the world because America is the only superpower on earth. That's the simple reason. That soft power or economic might have been backed by military power. The question is whether Japan can have the same kind of soft power without military might or just with economic might.
I remember when I was a correspondent in Singapore, I interviewed LKY, Lee Kuan Yew, then the prime minister of Singapore. I cannot remember exactly what he said during the interview, but what he argued was that Japan should be a leader in the region and world without any of the military might which Japan possessed before World War II, and with economic might. So Japan can exert leadership with economic might without military might. So the question is how Japan can have influential soft power with economic might without military might.
I personally hope that Japan will have that kind of soft power. But again, why does the U.S. have soft power, which has been so influential? It is because America is the only superpower on earth with a strong military might. Don't you think so?
Chair
Thank you.OK, Don, please.
Pathan
Thank you.Just real brief about what Mr. Yamaguchi was saying. He talked about the volume, about the Japanese putting out stories. But one luxury that Japan and many countries do not have is this. I got this from the web site of the People's Daily. It's interesting they reached the conclusion, "China's submarine poses no threat to Japan." This was based on a recent incident when the Chinese submarine was reportedly in Japan's waters, and America came out. And if you look at the other sidebar, you see: "China's remarkable growth not threat for Japan, said Koizumi." "China growth not threat but opportunity for Japan." Another one went, "China development no threat to Japan and the world, says PM."
My point is that some countries have the luxury of putting this kind of spin to it. If you look at the spin to it, normally the People's Daily doesn't write this long. But it seems to me like the information that came out of here-it's very good information, got to the point, details-it may be read like a military report. So I think that's one luxury that Japan doesn't have is to put that kind of spin, the kind of message that you want to get out, that one-liner. If you have to say one point, this headline says it all. I think that's one luxury that Japan doesn't have.
And another point is about the perception of history. I went to Yunnan this past year about three times to do a drug story, a story on drug trafficking, a lot of heroin coming out of Burma or Myanmar to southern China. And I noticed in my hotel in Yunnan, South Yunnan, toward the Burma border, hardly any tourists go there. And every time I go there, I turn on the TV, and I would see some sort of anti-Japanese movie, anti-Japanese documentary. And I remember visiting a palace of a warlord, and part of his palace was filled with anti-Japanese photos from World War II, people getting their heads cut off, and all that. But you look around, and you see hardly any tourists. So a lot of news I guess is for domestic consumption.
And here in East Asia we talk about the East Asia community, you know, but yet we are unable to turn the page. I think if you look at the Europeans and how they did that, right now they're talking about coming out with a constitution, but here you don't have that sense-the we the people-in Asia. So I think it's going to be very, very awkward progressing towards that sense of community, that sense of cooperation with these kinds of issues still being politicized. I'm not saying that it should not be, but I am saying that that is the nature of politics. I'll close right there.
Chair
Thank you, Pathan. Okay, Khieu.
Kola Khieu (Cambodia)
Thank you.I would like to make some comments about the role of Japanese media and Western media, how can they be an influence in my country, Cambodia. I have been working for American and Western media for almost six years. Yes, because in the Kingdom of Cambodia the Japanese language is not popular. The English language is very popular. But in the capital of the Kingdom of Cambodia, Toyota and electronic Sony are very popular with the young generation. We have a Nikkei station and a Nikkei office, and Kyodo News in Phnom Penh. I am a member of the Club of Cambodian Journalists. I have one friend of mine who worked for Kyodo News. We share information between the media of Japan in Cambodia and American media and Cambodia.
I work for Western and American media. We have common interests in dealing with the two superpowers in the world, America and Japan. We had to be sure when we say what is the role of the Western or Japan media. I think those two media should be cooperative, strongly cooperative when the world is facing this terrorism. We are going in the same direction. I know that there is a terrorist network in Southeast Asia, I myself have to say that the Japan media and the Western media should be cooperative to find who is the enemy of human beings, and to find out the common issues, common interests. So in Cambodia I work hard to help the people to give the word on matters like the network of al-Qaida. And this is a very interesting point, when the war against terrorism should play an important role for human beings to allow peace and solidarity.
We have Afghanistan and the Iraq situation. I hear that in the future maybe the Japanese prime minister is going to send troops to Iraq. So here is the role of the Japanese media in Iraq or Afghanistan in the future to cooperate with the Western media for cooperation for peace.
One other thing that I want to tell you about is the Japanese media's role in my country. In Cambodia I think maybe in 1994 I was the first to have written a story. I wrote about Japanese and the Japan relationship from a long time ago. In my article I said that a king of Cambodia has been here in Japan in 1605, 1606, and 1742. So the role of media in Cambodia, they lie about the history between the two countries. I'm not sure whether in Japan in libraries, talk shows, they have written about this or not. But in my country they have written about two kings, the Khmer king and the Japanese emperor, meeting in Tokyo, and they had cooperation a long time ago. And we also have the graffiti in Angkor Wat temple. You see, when Japanese tourists come to the Kingdom of Cambodia, they write something on the stones. They say they have been to heaven in the most beautiful Angkor Wat temple. This is a small kind of Japanese writing. They wrote something to give solidarity between two kingdoms, Cambodia and Japan. And I hope that in the future in my country maybe more of the younger generation will speak Japanese. I am very sorry when I come here, I cannot speak the Japanese language. I can understand only one word, arigato. Arigato.
Chair
Thank you, Mr. Kola Khieu. Maybe we are touching upon the very problematic items which should be discussed in the second session. So I would like to bring our track back to our first session's agenda, how the media in the ASEAN countries have reported on Japan, and vice versa. And as Mr. Khieu Kola explained, in Cambodia the reporters or journalists, some work for the American press and some work for the Japanese. And they have some collaboration among the journalists. And I heard from Ms. Vitug, too, and other panelists here, that they share some investigative reporting among us and with each other, reporting to the other countries' media. So I would like to listen to some more comments about the current reporting or journalism in the ASEAN countries, in ASEAN itself, and also Japan. Do you have any comments? How about from Indonesia? Mr. Karaniya, do you have any comments? Ms. Vitug, do you have any comments on this?
Vitug
Thank you.Actually I was just relating how a magazine with limited resources is able to do reporting on the region: we tap, for example, writers who work for Japanese news agencies and can travel and cover the ASEAN summit in Bangkok or the APEC meetings. They write for the Japanese press, but we ask them to write as well for us in a more analytical fashion. In that way, a magazine in a country like the Philippines, we can't afford to open up bureaus in Thailand or in Malaysia, so we get other journalists who work for the foreign press to write for the magazine.
I think in this afternoon session I will be sharing more of our experiences in the Philippines. But the interest now of our country in Japan is very rich, high on the counterterrorism aspect because of what has been happening in the region. There is continuous interest in what is Japan's role in the U.S. alliance against terrorism. And then, of course, we do a lot of coverage. Understandably, we have so many Filipinos in Japan who work here, migrant workers, so understandably we do a lot of stories on Filipinos here in Japan. And also I think it's hip now to be Asian in terms of pop culture. Aside from the Taiwanese group F4, a lot of Filipinos are hooked on the Japanese art, anime, cartoons.
So I think that a new generation of Filipinos and even Southeast Asians are looking at Japan in a different way. My parents look at Japan as the big, bad invader, while the younger kids now are glued to the television sets every day in the afternoons watching a cartoon series from Japan. So that's also a change in perception. And I think in terms of having access to intellectual works of Japanese, maybe that's a problem, because I would love to read antiglobalization books by Japanese. I would love to read books by Japanese on maybe what is leadership to them in the region, what they think of China. But because language is a factor, I don't have access to that, or other Filipinos don't have access to that.
So it may be interesting to note that a lot of Filipinos and other Southeast Asians are learning Japanese and are gaining scholarships in universities here in Japan. And that's maybe one way of bridging the gap. But still there is nothing like having universal access to the language.
So I think I will tell you more about this in detail. But these are the big things- counterterrorism, migrant workers, pop culture, what's hot in the Philippines today when it comes to Japan. Of course, underlying all of this is the never-ending love we Cambodians have for Toyota, Honda, and all of these Japanese brands which flood the country, including high technology.
Chair
Thank you, Ms. Vitug. I would like to ask one question to Mr. Karaniya, because you belong to Tempo Interactive. I found last night through my home Internet, I was looking for the Tempo web site, and I found that Tempo also has a Japanese-language web site. They have the English and also the Indonesian language, but also they serve in the Japanese language. Korean newspapers have such Japanese-language web sites, but for the first time I saw it on the Indonesian Tempo web site. So including this, could you please elaborate on some of your media reporting from Indonesia about ASEAN and Japan?
Karaniya
Yes. I think, as I said before, that for the older generation, the Second World War and the Japanese occupation of Indonesia is still a nightmare for most of them. But as Ms. Vitug from the Philippines said, for the younger generation, I think it is not a problem any more. Economic issues have been dominating Indonesian coverage of Japan, especially in the post-IMF era. As we know, Indonesia seems this year to have been cut off from its linkage to the IMF. And then we have to look to the Japanese to cover our foreign debt. So I think in the next year the relationship of Japan, Indonesia, and ASEAN countries will become a more and more important topic to be covered by the Indonesian media.
But I think that just before that the problem is, I think, the language. I think we have the kind of problem in Indonesia when trying to cooperate between journalists from Japan in Indonesia and our local journalists. I think that kind of problem has to be solved in the future. I think that's all. Thank you.
Chair
Now I would like to open the discussion to the floor. Do you have any comments from the floor? Yes, please.
Floor A
I am from an Indonesian newspaper, and I have one question. My question is addressed to Mr. Yamaguchi and Mr. Koike. It's regarding the Japanese mass media.
My experience here in Japan, I have been living here for around 10-12 years, and when I look at the Japanese mass media, they have a lot of influence from the American side. I would give one example: the word "ground zero." Still fresh in our memory, two years ago America was struck by terrorists, and the American press used the term "ground zero." And then the Japanese press also used "ground zero" until now.
My question is, is that right that Japanese mass media, Japanese press people follow the heart of the community, Japanese community, by using this "ground zero"? Because as far as I knew, a lot of Japanese people don't like using this kind of word. For me, it's better to use this word for Hiroshima people, or Nagasaki with regard to the atomic bombs during the Second World War. So what is your comment about using this influence from the American press?
Thank you.
Koike
It cannot be denied that the Japanese media has been influenced by the American media in terms of their coverage, in terms of their terminology, but I'm not so sure whether all of the newspapers or TV media use "ground zero" so often. I'm not so sure. Probably some of the newspapers, including Nikkei, have not used that kind of term so often. So it all depends on the situation, at least from my point of view. But, again, it cannot be denied that there is a lot of influence from the American media.
In some sense it is not so surprising, because the United States is the only superpower on earth. She has a very strong might in many areas. So it is quite natural that the Japanese media have been influenced by the American media. But, of course, that doesn't mean we should follow whatever the American media do. It doesn't mean so. So we have to be careful when using some coverage from the American media.
For example, the Nikkei newspaper has some contracts and subscribes to a lot of wire services from the United States, especially the Associated Press, but we should check the story very carefully. In other words, we are very careful when using stories from the American media, and every time we think we should have a Japanese point of view in the analysis.
Chair
Thank you, Mr. Koike. I would like to add some more. About the expression "ground zero," I agree with your opinion that this should be more suitable to explain about Hiroshima, Nagasaki, or Chernobyl. And for the U.S. press, when they use ground zero, it conveys a psychological shock to them, from the September 11th terrorist attack. I think that we should be careful about using this wording, as Mr. Koike mentioned. But we should also be aware of the influences of U.S. journalism and its jargon, or, how can I say, the way they present the news and put it in the headlines. Inside Kyodo News, when we translate or when our reporters in New York or Washington write about such stories, in our op-ed editorial department or our local correspondents in Hiroshima or Nagasaki, we ask them to write the reactions from the mayor of Hiroshima about that. In that way, we can make a balance in the reporting.
But from time to time in the newspaper itself, on the front page, the big photos and the term "ground zero" comes up, and maybe in the fifth page small comments from the mayor of Hiroshima about this appears. This could happen, I think, quite often. But the media always tries to give the information as much as possible and to make a balance. But in the newspapers it is kind of new journalism, something fresh in today's or yesterday's newspapers. So this is our media problem, but I think we have to keep on making a balance in our reporting.
Thank you. Do you have any other comments from the floor?
Floor B
My question is to Mr. Koike. Ms. Vitug pointed out that pop culture of Japan has a lot of influence in the ASEAN countries. A week ago you were chair of a symposium, and Mr. Koike just pointed out that the importance to the ASEAN countries of pop culture, and anime and music, and so on of Japan. Please let me know what you think about increasing our ability to influence, how to cultivate the Japanese culture in ASEAN countries. I would like to know that.
Koike
Thank you very much. I am happy that you participated in the international conference organized by Nikkei, the Japan Society of the United States, and Suntory Zaidan about what is a "cool Japan," or something like that. We focused on the pop culture of Japan, like animation. And we invited a director of the animation "Sailor Moon." I have never seen it before. But anyway, that was a wonderful discussion.
It's true that Japanese pop culture has been well received, especially among the young generation. Of course, there is a lot of criticism against Japanese pop culture, either too sexy, or something like this, from intellectuals in France and the United States. But again its influence is very strong among children and the younger generation. And I remember a professor of Keio University, Mr. Tadokoro, mentioned at the symposium that that kind of influence is kind of a basis for a better understanding of Japan by foreigners. What I mean is that kind of influence is in some sense very useful and very important for Japanese diplomacy. That kind of influence will make some basis for an understanding of Japanese society, in other words, a better understanding of the Japanese people, Japanese society as a whole. Probably we can categorize that kind of pop culture as some kind of soft power, but it is quite different from the soft power which Joe Nye of Harvard University mentioned.
And again personally, I really hope that the people outside Japan will enjoy that kind of animation or movie based on Japanese pop culture, but that doesn't mean we can exert some kind of strong leadership based on that kind of culture. What I can say is, we hope people will enjoy it. And based on that kind of pop culture, I really hope that people outside of Japan will understand what is Japan and what Japanese society and the people are. Am I answering your question?
Chair
Thank you, Mr. Koike. And the next voice from the floor, I think the gentleman over there raised his hand.
Floor C
I was just in charge of editing dictionaries in a publishing house, so I am not really sure I am qualified to participate in this symposium. But the person who asked a question earlier commented on "ground zero." I think he was talking about its connotation. I think that the real question is whether in using English we manage to understand the word or expression in question by going down to its connotation level. The moderator mentioned the economy very often, and also he said that this is a matter of Japan's capacity for sending information, or language. But I feel that the more Japanese people speak English, the more the thing they are trying to convey is melting away and disappearing.
And in connection with "ground zero," recently Japan was called "Jap" by North Korea, and the Japanese diplomats objected. I guess that the English term "North Korea" was questioned, although I only heard the news in Japanese. I believe that the Japanese people did not notice the connotation of "North Korea" until the North Korean delegation pointed it out. Why the North Koreans object when the Japanese people use this word while they do not object when the Westerners use it would be another question, but that's what I felt. To put it in a nutshell, in international conferences I think the Japanese people are better advised to speak Japanese more proudly.
Chair
Your opinion about connotation, yes, I agree that the matter of connotation is very important, and which during my 20 or 30 years of experience covering many different kinds of international conferences, I met with so many cases where is if I translate something literally it will cause some misunderstanding in the Japanese media or among the Japanese public. So we have to be careful about the connotation of using a literal translation or a quoted expression. Do you have any comment, Mr. Koike?
Koike
I agree with you. In international conferences we Japanese should use Japanese. The first time I participated, several years ago when I participated in this conference, I used Japanese, and I spoke in Japanese. I don't know whether the rule has been changed, but anyway I have to complain about it.
As for the North Korean issue, I read some story about it reported from our Seoul correspondent, I don't remember exactly. But, anyway, that kind of criticism against the Japanese on the terminology of North Korea has been very much a strategic move of the North Korean government. And many other media, not only Japanese but also foreign media, use the term "North Korea." So that kind of criticism is quite strange to me. Of course, connotation and terminology are very important, but the issue of North Korea is slightly different. It is a diplomatic issue.
Chair
Thank you, Mr. Koike. Do you have any comments among the panelists? Don?
Pathan
Just real quick. In the Thai press, for example, the Thai English-language press, we still refer to Myanmar as Burma even though the official name under the junta is Myanmar. There is a very popular word in Thailand; it is when we describe Thai politicians, and it is a Thai word. And it is a loan word from the English "corruption." And every Thai will know what that word means. So I'm not really sure if loaned words are so bad. Even though Americans themselves, or the Western press, sometimes for lack of a better word use words like fundamentalist to describe the militant Islam, or the people who advocate Islam as the basis for a modern state. If you look at the history of this word, it refers to a period in the history of Christianity when the Christians were arguing about the divinity of the Bible. Those who were arguing were saying this is the divine word of God. They were called fundamentalists. But in Islam, Muslims don't debate over the divinity of the Koran, so really that word is not applicable. So I think a lot of academics are using a word like Islamist.
Chair
Thank you. Mr. Devan, please.
Devan
I just wanted to make an observation about popular culture. My son collects UGO cards. So I'm supposed to go look around for UGO cards for him. So I asked him, I said, "Why do you want UGO cards in Japanese? You can understand Japanese?" He said, "No, no. You get UGO cards because they are more powerful than American UGO cards."
Now I don't know whether this translates into influence, because let me tell you something that happened a few months ago. I walked into his bedroom. And there on his computer screen, a screen saver he had downloaded from somewhere, the Japanese imperial flag-not the Japanese flag now, the military flag. It was the one you see in Tora, Tora, Tora. I walked in and I got a shock. I said, "My God, where did you get that from?" My wife, who is of Chinese origin, had a fit. I mean, for him it means nothing. Now the point I'm trying to make about popular culture is that it is not the same as Ms. Vitug said. It is not the same as soft power. Global popular culture is actually divorced from any local presences. I mean, it is a kind of free-floating structure.
There is such a thing as global popular culture. And whatever Japanese products that feed into this becomes part of a global complex that is without any kind of specificity, specific reference to any particular cultural form. You can imagine say, for example, Hanae Mori, if the kimono comes back into fashion and becomes globally fashionable, it won't be the Japanese kimono any longer. It will be part of a globalized culture that is completely without specificity.
Chair
I agree. Even the sushi bars elsewhere in the world, New York or Paris, or the Pokemon or the pop or anime characters are throughout the world, but it doesn't necessarily mean that they understand or they love Japan or Japanese culture. So this is a matter which you have to think about maybe in the afternoon session.
And also we touched on so many important topics already this morning about, for example, China's presence or Japan's role in security, or the FTA, how Japan's economy should go. Especially when Mr. Devan mentioned in his last comments, he summed up Asian reporting in Japan as self-reflective. And also he mentioned that Japan was said to be number one, but now its days are over. And Asia made efforts to become a sort of mirror of Japan for industrialization or for development. But Mr. Devan mentioned the mirror for Asia ex-Japan, as financial analysts called the rest of Asia. What is Asia ex-Japan to Japan? This question is very difficult, but I think it is worth thinking about it.
In this sense we would like to continue our discussion in the afternoon. But I would like to ask some comments from the panelists in concluding our morning session. Do you have anything special for our discussions? Mr. Karaniya, do you have any additional comments?
Karaniya
Yes, I think I would like to highlight about how the ASEAN and Japan press should be careful to use connotation, especially in the war on terrorism coverage. For example, when President Bush used the term "let's crusade" against terrorism, I think the impact is very, very negative in Indonesia. As you know, Indonesia, 80 percent of its population is Muslim. So the issue shifts from war on terrorism to an attack on Islam. And those kind of complications now help in the using of Jemmah Islamia. Jemmah Islamia is an Arabic word meaning Islamic community. So this kind of thing is very disturbing and it thwarts our effort in the war on terrorism. I think what my colleague highlighted is very worthy to consider for all of us.
Chair
Thank you. Are there any other comments? If not, I think the morning session-it's already past noon-so I would like to conclude this morning session. And in the afternoon we are going to have from 1:30 the second session. The title is, "Key Issues Reported by the Region's Day-to-Day Media-Security, Economic Development, Foreign Affairs, Social Issues, Religion, Etc." So how the ASEAN media report the common problems in ASEAN, and their major contribution to the development of the region. We would like to continue our discussion in the afternoon. Thank you.
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